• In this new seminar series the UA Software Security Group in collaboration with Cloakware Inc. will present talks from UA and invited speakers under the broader theme of security. Topics will range from national security to computer game security to network security.
  • Seminars are held Fridays 10-11 in Room 906, 9th floor of the Gould-Simpson Building, at the University of Arizona campus, unless otherwise stated. Here's a map to the building.
  • Refreshments will be served.

Nov 6 2009
Integrated Human Decision Making and Planning Model under Extended Belief-Desire-Intention Framework: Emergency Evacuation Applications
Young-Jun Son
Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering, University of Arizona
In this talk, we discuss an integrated Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) modeling framework for human decision making and planning, whose sub-modules are based on Bayesian belief network, Decision-Field-Theory, and probabilistic depth first search technique. A key novelty of the proposed model is its ability to represent both the human decision-making and decision-planning functions in a unified framework. In this talk, the proposed modeling framework is demonstrated for human's evacuation behaviors under a terrorist bomb attack situation. To mimic realistic human behaviors, attributes of the BDI framework are reverse-engineered from the human-in-the-loop experiments conducted in the Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) available at The University of Arizona. A crowd simulation is then constructed, where individual human behaviors are based on what was learned from the CAVE experiments. In this work, the simulated environment and humans conforming to the proposed BDI framework are implemented in AnyLogic agent-based simulation software, where each human entity calls external Netica BBN software to perform its perceptual processing function and Soar software to perform its real-time planning and decision-execution functions. The constructed crowd simulation is then used to test impact of several factors (e.g. demographics of people, number of policemen, information sharing via speakers) on evacuation performance (e.g. average evacuation time, percentage of casualties). Finally, we discuss other emergency evacuation applications (e.g. evacuation behaviors under fire in a factory) and research extensions for the proposed BDI framework

TBD
Examining software that doesn't want to be examined
Saumya Debray
Department of Computer Science, University of Arizona
TBD

TBD
TBD
Fei-Yue Wang
Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering, University of Arizona
TBD

TBD
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Cloakware
TBD

Thu Feb 18
Exploiting Online Games
Gary McGraw
Cigital
The talk, based on a book of the same title (co-authored by Greg Hoglund), exposes the inner workings of online game security for all to see, drawing illustrations from MMORPGs such as World of Warcraft to discuss:
  • Why online games are a harbinger of software security issues to come
  • How millions of gamers have created billion dollar virtual economies
  • How game companies invade your privacy
  • Why some gamers cheat
  • Techniques for breaking online game security
  • How to build a bot to play a game for you
  • Methods for total conversion and advanced mods
But ultimately this talk is about security problems associated with advanced massively distributed software. With hundreds of thousands of interacting users, today's online games are a bellwether of modern software yet to come. The kinds of attack and defense techniques I describe are tomorrow's security techniques on display today.

Feb 5, 2010
TBD
Bhavani Thuraisingham
Cyber Security Research Center in the Erik Jonsson School of Engineering and Computer Science, University of Texas at Dallas
TBD

March 26, 2010
Cybersecurity: Emerging Conceptions and Comparative National Organizational and Strategic Responses
Chris Demchak
School of Government and Public Policy, Cyberspace Policy Research Group, University of Arizona and Strategic Research Department of the US Naval War College
TBD

Past talks


Oct 2, 2009
Radical Islam: An Attack from the Past or the Future?
Albert Bergesen
Department of Sociology, University of Arizona
If radical Islam isn't just defensive; isn't just fear of the modern; isn't just a passing thing, then what else might it be. Hints of the future; deeper asceticism's yielding the ultimate in self-control, Suicide Missions? Maybe. Wider communities of equality--the global umma? Maybe. But also maybe not. It is way to early to tell. Max Weber's speculations about the effects of the religious fundamentalism that was the Reformation came hundreds of years after his radical Protestants had their ascetic spasm; we are in the midst of the radical Islamists. We can only speculate about the possible civilizational implications of our present moment.

Oct 9, 2009
Intelligence and Security Informatics: The COPLINK and Dark Web Experience
Hsinchun Chen
Management Information Systems, University of Arizona
In this talk I will review the emerging discipline of Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) and its many potential research directions and caveats. Two internationally acclaimed research projects, COPLINK and Dark Web, will be discussed. Both projects have been supported by NSF, DOJ, DHS, etc. and developed by the University of Arizona's Artificial Intelligence Lab members. For more project information, please see: http://ai.arizona.edu.

Oct 23, 2009
Dealing with Liars: Misbehavior Identification via Renyi-Ulam Games
Loukas Lazos
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona
In this talk, we discuss the problem of identifying misbehaving nodes that refuse to forward packets in wireless multi-hop networks. We present several methods for monitoring node behavior that rely on message-overhearing, micro-payment systems, or acknowledgement schemes. To reduce the communication overhead associated with behavior monitoring, we map the process of locating misbehaving nodes to various versions of the classic Renyi-Ulam game of 20 questions. This mapping copes with colluding adversaries that coordinate their behavioral patterns to avoid identification and frame honest nodes.